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Abstract
I investigate R&D eﬀorts for process innovation in a monopoly with uncertain
demand. Two diﬀerent models are proposed, where either (i) the reservation
price is aﬀected by an additive shock and the marginal production cost is
increasing, or (ii) a multiplicative shock on the slope of demand combines
with a flat marginal production cost. In either case, price-setting behaviour
generates a larger R&D investment than quantity-setting behaviour. An
Arrowian interpretation of the first result and a Schumpeterian interpretation
of the second are proposed.
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1 Introduction
The incentives to invest in R&D (either for process or for product innovation)
have been extensively investigated in the existing literature. The available
contributions focus upon either (i) the role of uncertainty in the R&D activity,
given the prize to be awarded to the winner of the race, or (ii) the role of
the type of market competition, either Cournot or Bertrand, and market
structure in shaping firms’ incentives (for exhaustive accounts of both strands
see, e.g., Reinganum, 1989; and Martin, 2001, ch. 14).
To the best of my knowledge, the interplay between demand uncertainty
and firms’ R&D eﬀorts has not been investigated thus far, although there
exist several influential contributions dealing with demand uncertainty either
in monopoly (see Leland, 1972; Klemperer and Meyer, 1986) or in oligopoly
(Weitzman, 1974; Klemperer and Meyer, 1986) or in perfect competition
(Sandmo, 1971). All of these contributions focus upon the optimal price or
quantity choice and the relative profitability of such strategies. In particular,
Klemperer and Meyer (1986) show that if techology is characterised by an
increasing marginal production cost, then the monopolist is better oﬀ using
the output level rather than the price.
Here, I rely on Klemperer and Meyer’s analysis to model the relationship
between the monopolist’s incentive to invest in process innovation and de-
mand uncertainty. In particular, I propose two alternative models. In the
first, an additive shock appears in the demand function and the cost func-
tion is convex. Under these conditions, expected profits (gross of R&D costs)
are larger under quantity-setting behaviour. In the second, a multiplicative
shock aﬀects the slope of the demand function, while production costs are
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linear in the output level. Under these conditions, instead, expected profits
(gross of R&D costs) are larger under price-setting behaviour. In both cases,
the monopolist invests in R&D in order to reduce marginal cost. I show that,
irrespective of the assumptions adopted regarding the type of uncertainty and
the shape of the cost function, the optimal R&D investment is larger when
the monopolist sets the price than when it sets the output level. In the first
model, this is due to the fact that increasing the R&D eﬀort amounts in fact
to a decrease in the uncertainty aﬀecting the profits generated by fixing the
price; it is indeed an optimal response to the expected profit loss associated
with the variance of the shock, that the monopolist foresees when setting
the price. In the second model, R&D cannot contribute to reduce the eﬀects
of uncertainty on the expected profits associated with quantity-setting be-
haviour; therefore, the larger funds available under price-setting behaviour
drive the result.
The two alternative models are laid out and investigated in section 2.
Concluding comments are in section 3.
2 The setup
Consider a single-product monopolist operating in a market over t ∈ [0,∞) .
At t = 0 the firm invests in R&D for process innovation; then, over t ∈
[1,∞) , she supplies the good to the market by setting either the price or
the output level so as to maximise profits. Define as π the instantaneous
profits, gross of R&D costs, which are Γ (x) , x being the R&D eﬀort prouced
by the monopolist. The R&D cost function is characterised by the following
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properties: Γ0 (x) > 0 and Γ00 (x) ≤ 0.
Assuming a constant discount factor δ ∈ [0, 1] , the expected net profit
flow is:
EΠ =
∞X
t=1
δtEπ − Γ (x) = δEπ
1− δ − Γ (x) . (1)
As to the issue of modelling production costs and the demand function, I will
consider two alternative cases based upon Klemperer and Meyer (1986):
• Model I: At any t ∈ [1,∞) , the market demand function is p =
a−Q+ε. The additive shock ε has E (ε) = 0 and E (ε2) = σ2. The cost
function is C (Q) = cQ2/2, with c = c (x) and c0 (x) < 0; c00 (x) ≥ 0.1
• Model II: At any t ∈ [1,∞) , the market demand function is p =
a − Q/θ. The shock on the slope of demand, θ, has E (θ) = 1 and
E
¡
θ2
¢
= s2 > 1. Accordingly, I may define z ≡ E (1/θ) , which is larger
than one (by Jensen’s inequality). The cost function is C (Q) = γQ,
with γ = γ (x) and γ0 (x) < 0; γ00 (x) ≥ 0.
In both models, the monopolist may use either price or quantity as the
market variable to maximise per-period profits.
2.1 Equilibrium analysis: Model I
Under the additive shock on the vertical intercept of the demand function
(i.e., the reservation price), the per-period monopoly profits are:
EπQ =
a2
2 [2 + c (x)]
; EπP = EπQ −
σ2
2
c (x) (2)
1As is known from Klemperer and Meyer (1986, Lemma 1), if the marginal production
cost were constant, then the additive shock on demand would exert no eﬀects on the
equilibrium behaviour of the firm.
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under quantity- and price-setting behaviour, respectively (cf. Klemperer and
Meyer, 1986, pp. 636-37). Therefore, the larger the variance, the larger the
diﬀerence EπQ − EπP , all else equal. Profits (2) can be plugged into (1)
in order to derive the first order conditions (FOCs) pertaining to the R&D
activity at t = 0, in the two cases:
∂EΠQ
∂x
=
δ
1− δ ·
∂EπQ
∂x
− Γ0 (x) = 0⇔
− δa
2c0 (x)
2 (1− δ) [2 + c (x)]2
− Γ0 (x) = 0; (3)
∂EΠP
∂x
=
δ
1− δ ·
∂EπP
∂x
− Γ0 (x) = 0⇔
− δa
2c0 (x)
2 (1− δ) [2 + c (x)]2
− σ
2
2
· c0 (x)− Γ0 (x) = 0. (4)
From (3-4), one obtains:
∂EΠP
∂x
− ∂EΠQ
∂x
= −σ
2
2
· c0 (x) > 0 (5)
given that c0 (x) < 0.
2.2 Equilibrium analysis: Model II
Now examine the setup where the shock aﬀects the slope of the demand
function. In this case, per-period profits are (cf. Klemperer and Meyer,
1986, pp. 636-37):
EπQ =
[a− γ (x)]2
4z
; EπP = z ·EπQ = [a− γ (x)]
2
4
. (6)
Here, EπQ < EπP since z > 1. Proceeding as in the previous subsection, one
has to calculate the FOCs pertaining to the R&D phase at t = 0 :
∂EΠQ
∂x
= −δ [a− γ (x)] γ
0 (x)
2 (1− δ) z − Γ
0 (x) = 0; (7)
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∂EΠP
∂x
= −δ [a− γ (x)] γ
0 (x)
2 (1− δ) − Γ
0 (x) = 0, (8)
implying:
∂EΠP
∂x
− ∂EΠQ
∂x
= −δ (z − 1) [a− γ (x)] γ
0 (x)
2 (1− δ) z > 0 (9)
given that γ0 (x) < 0.
The discussion of the two models can be summarised in the following
Proposition:
Proposition 1 Irrespective of whether (i) the marginal cost is increasing
and demand is aﬀected by an additive shock, or (ii) the marginal cost is flat
and uncertainty aﬀects the slope of demand, the R&D investment is larger
when the monopolist sets the price than when it sets the output level.
However, the source of the result is diﬀerent in the two cases. With
increasing marginal cost and an additive shock on the vertical intercept of
demand, gross profits are larger under quantity-setting behaviour, so that
the firm invests more under price-setting in order to reduce the negative
bearings of the reservation price variance on profits. In the limit, as the
marginal cost tends to zero, the eﬀect of the shock disappears altogether.
That is, by increasing the intensity of the R&D eﬀort, the monopolist gets
two eggs in one basket: a more eﬃcient technology as well as a reduction
in the negative eﬀects of uncertainty on profits. This is an insurance policy
against uncertainty which has an Arrowian flavour, as lower profits call for
more intense R&D eﬀorts. On the contrary, in the presence of a constant
marginal cost coupled with a multiplicative shock on the slope of the demand
function, the interpretation of the result is Schumpeterian, as setting the price
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allows for higher expected gross profits than setting the output level. Given
that in this case a larger investment does not bring about a reduction in the
degree of uncertainty while it entails an increase in gross profits for any given
z, the incentive to invest in R&D is driven by a ‘deep purse’ argument.
3 Concluding remarks
I have modelled R&D eﬀorts for process innovation in a monopoly with un-
certain demand. Two diﬀerent models have been considered: one where an
additive shock on the reservation price couples with an increasing marginal
production cost, and the other with a multiplicative shock on the slope of
demand and a constant marginal production cost. In either case, price-
setting behaviour generates a larger R&D investment than quantity-setting
behaviour. The reason for this result is that process R&D provides the firm
with un insurance policy against uncertainty in the first model, while it can-
not do so in the second model.
Extending the above analysis to oligopoly models may represent a pro-
ductive perspective, which is left to future research.
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